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THE LEGALITY OF UNIVERSITY-CONDUCTED
DORMITORY SEARCHES FOR INTERNAL
DISCIPLINARY PURPOSES
Considerable controversy has arisen in recent years over the
extent to which the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures' protects a student's interest in his residence hall
room at a state university.2 While dormitory searches conducted to
procure evidence for use in criminal proceedings are clearly subject to
the constitutionally imposed search warrant requirement, 3 the question
of whether it is necessary to obtain a warrant for searches performed by
university officials solely for internal disciplinary purposes is far more
complex. In the latter case, two established legal principles come
squarely into conflict: the long-recognized power of a university to
promulgate and enforce reasonable regulations to effectuate legitimate
educational objectives and the constitutional right of a student to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The problems confronting university officials have changed rather
dramatically over the years,4 of course, but the necessity of maintaining
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Smyth v. Lubbers,
398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp.
725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); People v. Kelly, 195 Cal. App. 2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961);
People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Dist. Ct. 1968), afrd mem., 61
Misc. 2d 858, 306 N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. T. 1969); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa.
Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
3. Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971); see People v. Cohen, 57
Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Dist. Ct. 1968), afI'd mem., 61 Misc. 2d 858, 306
N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. T. 1969); cf. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272
A.2d 271 (1970). But cf. People v. Kelly, 195 Cal. App. 2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177
(1961). See note 95 infra.
4. Compare, for example, the following two observations on student conduct. The
first was made in 1924 by the Florida Supreme Court.
[F]or some time immediately preceding her suspension, which took place April
6, 1907, numerous disorders took place in the girls' dormitory where Miss Hunt
resided, some of which were described as hazing the normals, ringing cow bells
and parading in the halls of the dormitory at forbidden hours, cutting the
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some semblance of order in college residence halls has remained. Con-
sequently, the courts have uniformly held that universities have the
inherent authority to promulgate rules and regulations rationally related
to legitimate educational objectives.5 This authority, predicated upon
an institution's interest in "advancing its educational program and pro-
tecting its facilities and internal relationships . . ," has been judicially
recognized in decisions sustaining such dormitory regulations as parietal
rules,7 evening curfews, 8 and restrictions on room visitation between
males and femalesY
A university's disciplinary power, however, is not absolute. It is
delimited by the constitutional rights of its students.'" As the Supreme
lights, and such other events as were subversive of the discipline and rules of
the University. Some of the witnesses spoke of these disorders as bordering
on insurrection. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 514-15, 102 So. 637, 639
(1924).
Less than half a century later, a New York court noted:
The practice of some students .. .who use narcotics and who take trips to
the outer world instead of to the library, is appalling enough. But this egregi-
ous stupidity and callous irresponsibility should not be matched by the wanton
invasion of constitutional liberties. People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 369,
292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (Dist. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 61 Misc. 2d 858, 306
N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. T. 1969).
5. In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Supreme Court quoted with
approval a position asserted by Justice Blackmun when he was a circuit court judge:
We . . .hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and
regulations; that it has the inherent power properly to discipline; that it has
power appropriately to protect itself and its property; that it may expect that
its students adhere to generally accepted standards of conduct. Id. at 192,
quoting Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
The power of a university to impose reasonable rules and regulations to effectuate
legitimate educational purposes has been similarly recognized by lower federal courts and
various state courts. See, e.g., Prostrollo v. University of S.D., 507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975) (all single freshmen and sophomores must live
in residence halls); Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974) (dormitory curfew for women only); Futrell v. Ahrens, 88
N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214 (1975) (ban on visitation in residence hall bedrooms by persons
of opposite sex) and cases cited therein.
6. ABA SECTION ON INDIVIDUAL RiGnHs AND RESPONSmuBLmS, A STATEmENT OF
TE RiGSr AND R SPONSIBILmrrs OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS in LAW AND
DISCIPLINE ON CAMPUS 209, 213 (G. Holmes ed. 1971).
7. Prostrollo v. University of S.D., 507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 952 (1975); Poynter v. Drevdahl, 359 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Mich. 1972); Pratz v.
Louisiana Polytechnic Inst., 316 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401
U.S. 951, affd mem., 401 U.S. 1004 (1971); Texas Woman's Univ. v. Chayklintaste, 530
S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1975).
8. Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 982 (1974).
9. Futrell v. Ahrens, 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214 (1975), citing Lynch v. Savig-
nano, Civ. No. 70-375-F. (D. Mass., Oct. 6, 1970); Buehler v. College of William &
Mary, Civ. No. 62-70-NN (E.D. Va., Apr. 6, 1970).
10. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Robinson v. Board of Regents,
475 F.2d 707, 709 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974); Esteban v.
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Court has stated, "[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are
'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect. . ... . In accordance with this
conclusion, it has been expressly held that the fourth amendment pro-
tects students living in on-campus housing from unreasonable searches
and seizures. 12  Constitutional rights of university students have also
been recognized, at least in dicta, in such areas as equal protection,
freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. 3
The only standard for evaluating the constitutionality of searches
which appears on the face of the fourth amendment is that of reasona-
bleness. In giving substance to this standard, the Supreme Court has
held repeatedly that, while a warrant is normally required, 14 there exist a
Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
965 (1970); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See note 13 infra.
11. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969). In Tinker the Court invalidated on first amendment grounds a high school
regulation proscribing the wearing of black armbands, the school having failed to
demonstrate that such symbolic activity would have a disruptive effect.
Although the Tinker case involved the first amendment rights of high school
students, it has been relied upon in the college context, where it was deemed "equally
applicable to all constitutional protections." Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d
707, 709 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974). That Tinker should apply
to collegians as well as secondary students is an obviously sound result. Most college
students, unlike their high school counterparts, have reached the age of majority.
Consequently, any efforts to restrict constitutional rights on the basis of the declining
doctrine of in loco parentis are even less appropriate in regard to university students. See
Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
368, 375-78 (1963); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L..
582, 590-91 (1968).
12. Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398
F. Supp. 777, 786 (W.D. Mich. 1975); see People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 369, 292
N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (Dist. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 61 Misc. 2d 858, 306 N.Y.S.2d 788
(App. T. 1969); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 435-36, 272 A.2d
271, 273 (1970); cf. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala.
1968) (holding dormitory resident's fourth amendment rights subject to university's right
to promulgate reasonable regulations). But see People v. Kelly, 195 Cal. App. 2d 669,
16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961) (upholding dormitory search).
13. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (freedom of speech); Prostrollo
v. University of S.D., 507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975)
(freedom of association); Cooper v. Nix, 496 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1974) (equal
protection); Keegan v. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975) (freedom of
religion). For a discussion of a dormitory resident's right to privacy in the con-
text of university parietal rules, see Note, Mandatory Housing Requirements: The
Constitutionality of Parietal Rules, 60 IowA L. R-v. 992, 1000-22 (1975). See also Van
Alstyne, Procedural Due Process, supra note 11, at 387.
14. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). See note 3 supra.
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few closely limited exceptions to this requirement based upon the pres-
ence of exigent circumstances.' 5 This Note will consider the question of
whether residence hall searches for school disciplinary reasons fall with-
in the latter category. Stated more specifically, the issue is whether
those unique characteristics of the university environment which have led
to the development of a judicially sanctioned general regulatory power
will automatically render a warrantless disciplinary search "reasonable"
within the terms of the fourth amendment.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STATUS OF DORMITORY SEARCHES:
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
In its opinion in Smyth v. Lubbers,'8 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan has provided the most
comprehensive recent treatment of the dormitory search problem, in a
factual context which probably typifies the disciplinary procedures fol-
lowed at many colleges and universities. The controversy arose when a
student's dormitory room at Grand Valley State College in Allendale,
Michigan was searched by campus police and administrators. 7 The
search was conducted pursuant to two college regulations, incorporated
by reference into the student's residence hall contract,' 8 which prohibit-
15. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (incident to a lawful
arrest); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border search);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970) (automobile search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) (medical emergency); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975) (search of parolee's residence by parole officer);
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (search of proba-
tioner by probation officer).
Warrantless searches have also been upheld in several situations involving employ-
ees of tightly controlled government agencies. See United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d
863 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966) (search of customs service
employee by customs agents); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964)
(search of soldier's quarters by commanding officer); United States v. Donato, 269 F.
Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967) (search of mint
employee's locker).
Similarly, limited warrantless searches have been deemed constitutional when highly
regulated industries are involved. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
(firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor).
16. 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
17. Id. at 782. See note 91 infra.
18. The residence hall contract provided in part:
The undersigned, in consideration for the board and room provided by
Grand Valley State College, dotes] hereby agree as follows:
(2) To abide by the terms and conditions of residence in Grand Valley
State College residence halls as stated in the current housing handbook, which
terms and conditions are specifically made a part thereof [sic]. (3) That res-
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ed the possession of marijuana19 and authorized college officials to
search a dormitory room if they had "reasonable cause" to believe a
student was violating either a criminal law or a university regulation. 20
The search having revealed a quantity of marijuana, the student filed
suit in federal court seeking "a judgment declaring that the search was
. . .illegal and unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction prohibit-
ing the defendants from expelling or suspending him from the College
on the basis of any evidence discovered in the course of the search, or
the fruits thereof."'21  The student's claim was not adjudicated, how-
idency in Grand Valley State College residence halls, and this contract, are
subject to all rules and regulations of Grand Valley State College. 398 F. Supp.
at 782.
19. The college's student handbook stated:
The possession, distribution or use by a student of any narcotic or hallu-
cinogenic drugs, including marijuana, in either the refined or crude form except
under the direction of a licensed physician is prohibited. Id. at 781-82.
20. The student handbook further provided:
2. Student rooms may be entered by residence hall staff-members if any
of the following situations exist:
c. College officials have reasonable cause to believe that students are con-
tinuing to violate federal, state or local laws or College regulations, the
room is subject to search by College authorities. A search will be con-
ducted reluctantly and only if authorized by the GVSC President or a de-
signee.
3. Student rooms may be entered and searched by county and state offi-
cials only after a search warrant has been presented stating the reason for the
search. Id. at 782.
21. Id. at 791. The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because
of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,
by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985
of Title 42;
(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid
in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had
knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, or-
dinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity se-
cured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right




ever, until after the school's judicial board had admitted the marijuana as
evidence in its proceedings and had suspended him for one term.22
The court found initially that the student had "the same interest in
the privacy of his room as any adult has in the privacy of his home
* . .,"2 and that therefore fourth amendment protections, including the
general warrant requirement, were applicable.24 In urging an exception
to the warrant requirement, the college advanced each of the three
arguments raised most frequently in the dormitory search cases: waiv-
er,25 inherent institutional authority to impose reasonable regula-
tions,2 6 and a lesser administrative search theory based on Wyman v.
James.27  Each was rejected by the court in reaching its decision to
grant the requested relief. Using the facts and analysis in Smyth as a
starting point, this section will discuss the general applicability of the
first two of these three asserted justifications for warrantless dormitory
searches. The applicability of the Wyman case to such searches will be
considered in the following section.
Waiver
Courts have occasionally viewed the university-student relationship
as being grounded in contract,28 either express2 9 or implied.30 It would
22. 398 F. Supp. at 783.
23. Id. at 786.
24. Id. at 786, 793.
25. Id. at 788.
26. Id. at 789.
27. Id. at 793 citing 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
28. This theory is at least tangentially related to the right of a landlord to inspect
leased premises and to make necessary repairs. For a discussion of a landlord's covenant
to enter and make repairs, see 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 2331] (1975). The
relationship between a university and a dormitory resident, however, is not strictly one of
landlord and tenant. See Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 1971)
(Clark, J., dissenting); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D.
Ala. 1968); Englehart v. Serena, 318 Mo. 263, 273, 300 S.W. 268, 271 (1927). Even if
it were such a relationship, this would not enable the university to delegate its right of
inspection to police or other third parties. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961) (landlord could not consent to search of tenant's dwelling); United States v.
Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (employee's superior could not consent to police
search of employee's desk); Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970),
af 'd, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971) (college could not consent to police search of
dormitory room); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 435-36, 272 A.2d
271, 273 (1970) (college could not consent to police search of dormitory room under
landlord-tenant analogy); Delgado, College Searches and Seizures: Students, Privacy,
and the Fourth Amendment, 26 HAS-NGS L.J. 57, 62 (1974). But see Moore v. Student
Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); People v. Kelly, 195 Cal. App. 2d
669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961) (upholding warrantless searches of dormitory room by
college officials and police); cf. United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir.
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seem that, under this view, a student could agree to waive certain rights
or privileges when he matriculates at college or engages to live in on-
campus housing. 31 Fourth amendment rights, like other constitutional
rights, are subject to voluntary waiver. 3 2  If an individual knowingly
offers his advance consent to the search of certain premises, it is argu-
able that he no longer has "a reasonable expectation of privacy"33 in
such property."
The shortcoming of this line of reasoning is its presupposition that
the student and the university stand in roughly equal bargaining posi-
tions. In fact, the relative positions of the two parties are often anything
but equal, with residence hall agreements frequently possessing many of
the characteristics of adhesion contracts. 35 As was the case in Smyth, a
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967) (landlord could consent to police search of
leased premises where tenant had authorized landlord to receive deliveries on such
property).
29. See, e.g., University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966). See also Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968)
(stating that student's relationship with state university was not contractual but holding
that student had "waived" objections to reasonable searches conducted pursuant to school
regulation).
30. See, e.g., Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1265 (S.D. Miss. 1970), affd
per curiam, 440 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1971); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d
632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, af'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834
(1962). But see People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (Dist.
Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 61 Misc. 2d 858, 306 N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. T. 1969).
31. See cases cited in notes 29 & 30 supra.
32. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968); see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (6th amendment);
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (5th amendment). The Supreme Court has
recognized, however, that consent to a search does not constitute a waiver in the same
sense as that term is used in other contexts. Consent to a search, unlike waiver of other
constitutional rights, is valid even when there is no demonstration that it was a knowing
and intelligent relinquishment of fourth amendment protections. Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. at 235-46. See generally Mintz, Search of Premises by Consent, 73 DICK.
L. R-v. 44 (1968).
33. The fourth amendment concept of "a reasonable expectation of privacy" was
first articulated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
34. Professor Wright has contended that the existence of a university regulation
reserving the right to search student dormitory rooms precludes the possibility of a
student having a reasonable expectation of privacy. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 663 (1969); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus,
22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1079 (1969). This argument, howevqr, fails to consider
the inequality in bargaining position inhering in the university-student contractual
relationship, and it does not take account of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
See notes 35-39 infra and accompanying text.
35. It has been observed by Professor Van Alstyne that
[t]he rules which a student "contracts" to observe are altogether nonnegoti-
able, and there is in fact an absence of bargaining. . . . Thus, the nonnego-
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student is often required effectively to waive certain rights as a precondi-
tion to enrolling at a given university or taking advantage of housing
which it owns or subsidizes.3" As the Smyth court recognized, however,
a waiver of a constitutional right is ineffective unless knowingly and
voluntarily made. 7  Moreover, at least in the case of state universities,
any such waiver might also be prohibited under the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions.38 It has consistently been held that "the state, in
operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attend-
ance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitu-
tional rights." 39
Inherent Institutional Authority
Universities, as noted above, have long been held to have broad
tiability of terms is compounded by the real lack of shopping alternatives, the
inequality of the parties in fixing terms, parallel practices among sellers, and
the impotency of individual applicants to affect terms. The contracts are
purely on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Frequently, the student has little idea of
the terms of his contract in advance of matriculating, as he more often than
not becomes enrolled before being presented with any sort of handbook which
states the conditions of his attendance. Occasionally, he does not receive the
handbook at all. Its provisions are typically subject to change at the sole
pleasure of the college. Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident,
supra note 11, at 583 n.l.
For a similar argument, see Delgado, supra note 28, at 70-71.
36. 398 F. Supp. at 788.
37. Id. See note 32 supra. Cf. Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir.
1971) (waiver deemed invalid). Contra, Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp.
725, 731 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (waiver deemed valid).
38. The doctrine provides that the "enjoyment of governmental benefits may not be
conditioned upon the waiver or relinquishment of significant constitutional rights, in the
absence of some compelling social interest which justifies the subordination of those
rights under the circumstances." Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the
Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW
rN TRANSrION Q. 1, 21 (1965); see Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1595 (1960).
39. Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707, 709 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 982 (1974); see Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1971)
(fourth amendment); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156-57
(5th Cir. 1961) (due process); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 788 (W.D. Mich.
1975) (fourth amendment); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613,
618 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1967) (first amend-
ment). See also Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not alter the fact that, in certain
circumstances, the presence of a compelling state interest may justify the subordination
of a fundamental constitutional right. See note 58 infra. Since the preservation of a
university's educational function would appear to qualify as a "compelling" interest, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not, in itself, determine the legality of
particular conduct. The more significant inquiry is whether the university regulation, on
its face and as applied, reasonably promotes a legitimate educational objective. See
notes 44-58 infra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1976:770]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
power to promulgate and enforce such regulations as are necessary to
the achievement of educational goals.40 The leading authority for extend-
ing this recognized power to exempt dormitory searches from the war-
rant requirement is Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State
University.41
In Moore, the district court upheld a warrantless dormitory search,
authorized by university regulations, 42 which was conducted by a cam-
pus administrator accompanied by state narcotics agents. Initially, the
court established the premise that colleges have "an 'affirmative obliga-
tion' to promulgate and enforce reasonable regulations designed to
protect campus order and discipline and to promote an environment
consistent with the educational process. '43  A two-step rationale was
ostensibly employed to assess the constitutional validity of regulations so
promulgated. First, the court asked whether the regulation in question
was in fact necessary to the achievement of a legitimate educational
purpose.44 If so, then a presumption of facial validity was created
which could be overcome on the second level only by a showing that the
regulation had been unreasonably applied.4 5 The court found both the
Troy State regulation and its application acceptable.4 6
The Smyth court appeared to apply the same test in a similar
factual context, but reached an opposite result. While recognizing the
educational necessity of imposing restrictions on drug use,47 the court
rejected the search on the second level, finding that the method of
application went far beyond the reasonable -requirements of any justi-
fiable educational purpose.48
The tests applied by the two courts, however, were not identical.
While both started from the premise that colleges have the power to
establish and enforce reasonable regulations, differences appear in their
40. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
41. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
42. The search was conducted pursuant to a regulation, printed in various student
handbooks, which provided:
The college reserves the right to enter rooms for inspection purposes. If
the administration deems it necessary the room may be searched and the occu-
pant required to open his personal baggage and any other personal material
which is sealed. Id. at 728.
43. Id. at 729 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 728-30.
45. Id. at 730.
46. Id. While the Fifth Circuit held in Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.
1971), that the Troy State regulation could not be construed to authorize the college to
consent to police searches for evidence of c.rime, the result in Moore was not disturbed.
47. 398 F. Supp. at 790.
48. Id. at 789-90.
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interpretations of the second-level question regarding reasonable appli-
cation. The Moore court's definition of reasonable application only
required that the college authorities have a "reasonable belief' that a
student was using his room for a purpose which contravened a school
regulation.4 9 If such a belief existed, a university-conducted search was
fully authorized despite the fact that it infringed "to some extent on
the outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights of students. '50
It has been recognized by most courts, including those in both
Smyth and Moore, that the fourth amendment protects students living in
on-campus housing from unreasonable searches and seizures.51 Ac-
cordingly, the reasonableness of the search must be determined regard-
less of whether it only infringed on the "outer bounds" of the student's
rights. The Smyth court appears to have correctly stated the problem
when it recognized that any invasion of one's fourth amendment rights
runs to the "very core" of the amendment.52
The Smyth court's analysis provided a more demanding test than
that proposed in Moore for determining whether a regulation has been
reasonably applied. That test, based upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
5 3
demonstrates the weaknesses inherent in the solution advanced in
Moore. In Tinker, the Court implicitly acknowledged that the state's
interest in the maintenance of school order was sufficient to overcome a
fundamental constitutional right."4 A school regulation prohibiting po-
tentially disruptive conduct, therefore, would be reasonable. Each ap-
plication of the regulation, however, must be specifically justified by a
showing of compelling facts demonstrating a threat to the state's legiti-
mate interest.5" In Tinker, for example, the Court required "facts
which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substan-
49. 284 F. Supp. at 730.
50. Id. at 729.
51. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. at 786; Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F.
Supp. at 729.
52. 398 F. Supp. at 786.
53. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See note 11 supra.
54. Id. at 507.
55. Id. at 514.
The doctrine that a regulation must be valid both on its face and in its implementa-
tion has long been recognized as a matter of constitutional law. See Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Furthermore,
"[a] search which is reasonable at its inception may yet violate the Fourth Amendment
by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope." United States v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp.
148, 153 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973), citing Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas,
J., concurring); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931).
Vol. 1976:770]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tial disruption of or material interference with school activities. .. .
Similarly, in the dormitory search context, the university must be able to
take the step beyond the reasonableness of the regulation and show its
compelling interest in the chosen method of application on the occasion
in question. In Moore, decided prior to Tinker, the court was influ-
enced by the facial reasonableness of the regulation in determining the
reasonableness of its application.17 The Smyth court, however, took the
only acceptable post-Tinker approach, and independently scrutinized
the actual means of application to determine whether the university had
a compelling interest in acting as it did.18
Wyman v. James: THE "LESsER SEARCH" CONCEPT AND THE
PERMISSIBILITY OF REASONABLE WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
The fourth amendment imperative that searches be reasonable'0
has generally been thought to necessitate use of a search warrant "sub-
ject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions
.... ,"0 The Supreme Court's opinion in Wyman v. James,"' how-
ever, suggests that some warrantless "searches" may be constitutionally
permissible even though not within any of the traditional exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Consequently, it may be possible to argue, as
did the university in Smyth,6 2 that although university-conducted dormi-
56. 393 U.S. at 514.
57. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
58. 398 F. Supp. at 789-90. The problem facing the courts in regard to fourth
amendment rights differs from that with respect to first amendment or due process
rights. Inherent in the definition of the latter is a balancing process, weighing the
interests of the state against those of the individual. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic."); Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1956) ("Due process cannot be
confined to a particular set of existing procedures because due process speaks for the
future as well as the present, and at any given time includes those procedures that are
fair and feasible in the light of then existing values and capabilities"). While there is
also a balancing process involved in fourth amendment considerations, see Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967), the Court has traditionally stated that a
warrantless search will be deemed reasonable only in a few well-defined areas. Any bal-
ancing that occurs is inherent in the reasonableness standard imposed by the terms of the
amendment, See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 1 supra.
60. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See notes 14-15 supra and
accompanying text.
61. 400U.S. 309 (1971).
62. 398 F. Supp. at 793.
The Smyth court rejected the Wyman analogy out of hand, finding that case "simply
inapposite." Id. The court focused in conclusory fashion on the dissimilarities between
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tory searches for intra-institutional purposes do not normally fall within
any of the historically exempt categories,63 such searches are still per-
missible under Wyman. In Wyman the Court upheld a New York
statute64 requiring a welfare recipient to submit to periodic visits by case
workers as a condition precedent to the continuation of benefits.6 5 The
Court advanced alternative rationales for its holding: first, a welfare
visit is not a search as contemplated by the fourth amendment;6
second, even assuming that the visit does constitute a search, such a
warrantless intrusion is reasonable and therefore not violative of the
fourth amendment.67
In finding that no fourth amendment search had occurred, the
Court relied on the predominance of the rehabilitative over the investiga-
tive aspects of the search, noting that the latter factors were insignificant
when compared with a more traditional search in the criminal law
context.6 8  It was further emphasized that the actual physical entry was
not compelled, but could be avoided by a choice not to seek additional
benefits.69 Although a search of a residence hall room by school
administrators for intra-institutional purposes also differs significantly
from a classic search for criminal evidence, the "no search" rationale of
Wyman would appear to be inapplicable. Regardless of any education-
al ends which it may ultimately serve, a dormitory search where contra-
band or proscribed conduct is suspected is by its very nature investiga-
tive. Furthermore, in the typical dormitory search situation there is no
opportunity to avoid the physical intrusion; in Smyth, for example, entry
was made without the consent of the occupants of the room.7 Finally,
the two situations discussed in this section, but ignored the apparent parallels. The
Smyth court also failed to distiniguish between Wyman's alternative rationales. The
contention of this Note is that the Wyman analogy is at least sufficiently strong to
merit detailed consideration. See notes 72-94 infra and accompanying text.
63. See note 15 supra. One court has suggested in dictum that dormitory searches
constitute one of the traditional exceptions. United States v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp. 148,
152 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
64. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 134-a (McKinney 1976). The statute, passed as part of
the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, provided for limited investi-
gations of a recipient's eligibility, set forth the guidelines for the investigations, and
authorized denial of benefits if home visitation was refused by the recipient. Id.
65. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see note 38 supra, is not applicable
in the welfare context in light of the Court's conclusion in Wyman that the condition
established by the statute did not require a welfare recipient to sacrifice any constitution-
al rights. See notes 66 & 68-69 infra and accompanying text.
66. 400 U.S. at 317-18.
67. Id. at 318-24.
68. Id. at 317.
69. Id. at 317-18.
70. 398 F. Supp. at 782.
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the absence of prospective criminal proceedings does not vitiate this
conclusion, as it has been established that fourth amendment protections
are not limited to criminal proceedings.71
The second Wyman rationale, that limited warrantless searches
may be reasonable under certain circumstances, is more nearly apposite
to dormitory searches. Several of the special circumstances justifying
warrantless searches in the welfare setting are likely to be present in the
context of university residence searches. 2
In Wyman the Court emphasized the legitimate state objective of
assuring that a tax-supported program not be frustrated.73 This reason-
ing seems to be equally applicable in regard to campus dormitories,
where highly congested, interdependent living conditions pose unique
problems. Not only does a university have a responsibility to protect its
physical facilities, but, more importantly, it has an interest in creating
and maintaining an educational atmosphere within university housing.74
Additionally, in many situations a search may be the only practical
means of accomplishing the legitimate state objectives. In Wyman the
Court noted that alternative procedures would not supply certain infor-
mation obtainable through a welfare search: verification of actual resi-
dence at a stated address, determination of any impending medical
needs of dependent children, and the existence of dependent children
not yet registered in school. 75  Similarly, a warrantless dormitory search
might frequently be the only practical way to enforce necessary universi-
ty regulations. A search for electrically unsafe appliances, for example,
is directly analogous to the situation in Wyman: regular inspection is
clearly necessary here to protect state property, but in most cases there
will be no probable cause to suspect a violation on which a warrant
might be based. Moreover, in a case such as Smyth, where the univer-
sity admits to having had at least "reasonable" cause, a practical dilemma
would result if it were compelled to go to a magistrate to obtain a war-
rant. The university would effectively be forced to choose between non-
enforcement of necessary regulations, an arguable dereliction of its edu-
cational responsibilities, and regularly involving the public authorities in
71. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
72. See Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624, 628 (M.D. Ala. 1970), affl'd, 442
F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[Sltudents and their college share a special relationship
which gives to the college certain special rights . . .") (emphasis added). See note 83
infra and accompanying text.
73. 400 U.S. at 318-19.
74. See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
75. 400 U.S. at 322.
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campus affairs,76 a likely source of destructive tension among students,
administrators and campus security personnel. 77
Both welfare visits and dormitory searches do, of course, involve
significant governmental intrusion into an individual's living quarters.
The Wyman Court emphasized the limited non-criminal nature of the
search, however, and balanced that factor against the state's primary
objective, which was to carry out the rehabilitative purposes of the
welfare program.78  The typical university-conducted dormitory search
is similarly limited. While the absence of criminal overtones does not
remove a dormitory search from the fourth amendment search catego-
ry,79 it does increase the resemblance to the rationale of Wyman. 0  In
the first place, the potential impact on an individual student-whether
measured in terms of actual punitive measures or the collateral conse-
quences-has been held to be substantially less severe when evidence
procured in a dormitory search is to be used only in a campus discipli-
nary hearing."- Furthermore, the less onerous effect of university disci-
76. See Comment, Public Universities and Due Process of Lav: Students' Protec-
tion Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 17 U. KAN. L. REv. 512, 523 (1969);
Note, Equity on the Campus: The Limits of Injunctive Regulation of University Protest,
80 YALE L.J. 987, 1006-07 (1971).
Furthermore, it is quite likely that this same result would obtain if search warrants
were executed by campus police officers. See James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 946
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (McLean, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971) (contending that a warrant requirement as a condition precedent to a case
worker's inspection of welfare recipient's home would introduce "a hostile arm's length
element" between them); Comment, Public Universities, supra (observing that use of
warrants in searches of dormitory rooms by school officials would have detrimental
effect on the relationship between students and college administrators).
77. The argument that college officials must meet the same warrant requirements as
do law enforcement personnel appears strongest in areas where the regulation prohibiting
certain conduct overlaps with similar state statutory provisions. However, a regulation
such as that prohibiting the possession of drugs should only be considered as one of
many campus rules rather than as an extension of a statute. Accordingly, the same
considerations are involved whether the college seeks enforcement of a regulation
prohibiting the possession of drugs or one prohibiting the use of electrical appliances.
The rationale permitting the college to establish and enforce reasonable regulations
applies in both cases. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
78. 400 U.S. at 322-23.
79. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
80. The fact that it is not a criminal offense to refuse a dormitory search or a
welfare visit is significant. Where failure to submit to a mandatory inspection consti-
tutes a criminal offense, a warrant is required (although a less stringent probable cause
standard may be applicable). See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The Camara and See decisions were
distinguished on this basis-in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324-25 (1971).
81. One federal district court has concluded that, in terms of effect, there are




plinary proceedings enables an educational institution to take certain
actions "that would be impermissible if imposed by the government
upon all citizens" since there is "a constitutional distinction between the
infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition
of milder administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other, even
though the same . . . interest is implicated by each."8 2
Additionally, the dormitory search and the welfare visit are similar
in their essentially civilian nature.8 3  As suggested above,84 the Su-
In the case of irrevocable expulsion for misconduct, the process is not punitive
or deterrent in the criminal law sense, but the process is rather the determina-
tion that the student is unqualified to continue as a member of the educational
community. Even then, the disciplinary process is not equivalent to the crim-
inal law processes of federal and state criminal law. For, while the expelled
student may suffer damaging effects, sometimes irreparable, to his educational,
social, and economic future, he or she may not be imprisoned, fined, disenfran-
chised, or subject to probationary supervision. General Order on Judicial
Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax
Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 142 (W.D. Mo.
1968).
The purported analogy between criminal justice administration and university disci-
plinary procedures has also been rejected by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. Piazzola v.
Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415
F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). It should be noted,
however, that several commentators have given some credence to this comparison, at
least insofar as it involves the impact of the sanctions upon the individual being
disciplined. See Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom,
20 U. FLA. L. REV. 290, 296 (1968); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident,
supra note 11, at 595; Note, College Searches and Seizures: Privacy and Due Process
Problems on Campus, 3 GA. L. REV. 426, 439 (1969).
82. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 203 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
83. The Wyman Court noted that the welfare searches are conducted by case
workers rather than "by police or uniformed authority." 400 U.S. at 322. College
residence hall searches, however, are commonly conducted by campus security officers.
Moreover, over seventy percent of all campus security forces have been deputized by a
city, county, or state to make arrests for any criminal offenses occurring on campus.
Berman, Law and Order on Campus: An Analysis of the Role and Problems of the
Security Police, 49 J. URBAN L. 513, 519 (1971). Although the argument for abandon-
ing the warrant requirement in such a fact situation is somewhat less persuasive than in
Wyman, the use of campus police should not entirely undermine the lesser search
rationale. In Smyth, for example, two of the five university officials who searched the
student's room were campus policemen who were also deputy county sheriffs. 398 F.
Supp. 777, 782, 792. Such security officers function principally as university rather than
state officials. Moreover, the fact that they were deputized did not necessitate criminal
prosecution of the students. A Michigan law enforcement officer is never statutorily
required to make an arrest. Rather, "[any peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest
a person" for a felony or misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence or a felony
not committed in his presence if certain circumstances obtain. MIcH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 764.15 (1968) (emphasis added). In fact, a Michigan peace officer is
not authorized to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his
presence. People v. Dixon, 392 Mich. 691, 222 N.W.2d 749 (1974); Gallagher v.
Michigan Secretary of State, 59 Mich. App. 269, 229 N.W.2d 410 (1975). Consequent-
ly, the campus security officers in Smyth were free to utilize the intra-institutional
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preme Court's conclusion that search warrants have "seriously objection-
able features in the welfare context"s seems equally appropriate to the
university-student relationship.
Finally, in both the welfare visit and the dormitory search there is a
substantial concern for the welfare of an otherwise unprotected third
party. In arguing in favor of the reasonableness of the search in
Wyman, the Court looked first to the interests of the children of welfare
recipients, and found them to be "paramount. '8 6  In the dormitory
situation, the interests of those students who stand to be disturbed by
violations of university regulations are deserving of comparable consid-
eration. If a necessary regulation can be implemented only by means of
a warrantless search, there is a strong argument that the interests of the
intended beneficiaries of a state educational program should outweigh
the interests of those whose actions tend to frustrate the program's
purposes.
The typical dormitory search and the Wyman welfare visit do differ
in one important respect. The welfare client in Wyman was given
advance notice of the proposed visit87 and could have avoided the actual
physical intrusion by withholding consent.8 In a dormitory search like
that conducted in Smyth, on the other hand, the investigative purpose of
the search would be frustrated if the student were given advance warn-
ing or an opportunity to deny the authorities permission to enter.8 ' The
distinction is mitigated somewhat, however, by the fact that a refusal to
submit to the welfare visit would result in a termination of benefits. In
light of economic reality, the decision whether or not to acquiesce in the
visit can hardly be characterized as voluntary.
disciplinary proceedings rather than the criminal law system. See also ALA. CODE tit.
15, § 154 (1958); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1970); D.C. CODE § 23-581 (1973);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2 (Smith-Hurd 1970). But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 125, §
82 (Smith-Hurd 1970) ("It shall be the duty of every sheriff. . . or other officer having
the power of a sheriff. . . when any criminal offense. . . is committed or attempted in
his presence, forthwith to apprehend the offender. ... ).
Of course, a warrantless search of on-campus housing conducted by university
officials without the assistance of campus police-or at least without the aid of
deputized campus security officers-would present a factual situation more closely
analogous to that in Wyman.
84. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
85. 400 U.S. at 323.
86. Id. at 318.
87. Id. at 313.
88. Id. at 317-18.
89. A further distinction arises from the statement in Wyman that "[p]rivacy is
emphasized . . . . [SInooping in the home [is] forbidden." Id. at 321. The search
of a student's room obviously involves "snooping"; thus the intrusiveness of the entry
is significantly greater than that to which a welfare recipient is subjected.
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Wyman's second rationale does not propose another highly specific
exception to the warrant requirement, but rather allows a uniquely
flexible balancing approach to be invoked when the intrusion and its
consequences are limited and the justification is compelling.0 In view
of the considerations discussed above, the Wyman analysis would seem
to be appropriate for evaluating the constitutionality of a non-criminal
dormitory search. While it is clear that warrantless dormitory searches
for intra-institutional purposes are not strictly analogous to the welfare
visit considered in Wyman, many of the special circumstances which
impressed the Court in that case are also present in the college context.
In spite of the important distinctions, the points of analogy are suffi-
ciently strong to suggest that many otherwise questionable dormitory
searches can be upheld under Wyman's second rationale. The likelihood
of a finding of reasonableness would be enhanced by a university policy
against the kind of arbitrary use of the search power which occurred in
Smyth."' At a minimum, it should usually be required that dormitory
searches be authorized by unbiased university administrators other than
those conducting the search, that the application include a list of rea-
sons for the search and the objects or information sought, 92 and that the
90. Even in dealing with the traditional warrant exceptions, the Court has begun to
show considerable flexibility in permitting expansion to cover situations which are not
entirely analogous to the narrow circumstances originally used to justify the exception.
The recent expansion of the "search incident to arrest" exception illustrates this
trend. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court held that a warrantless
search could be conducted immediately after the arrest of a suspect in order to remove
from his person or reach weapons or destructible evidence. Id. at 762-63. In United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973), the "search incident" exception was used to justify a full, warrantless search of a
person arrested for a traffic violation, despite the absence of the factors underlying the
exception as set forth in Chimel. The Court stated that the officer making the arrest
need not assert that he believed that the arrestee was armed, Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235;
Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266, and, of course, there is little tangible evidence of a traffic
violation which might otherwise justify a search.
A similar expansion is apparent in the "stop and frisk" area. See, e.g., Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), which upheld a frisk conducted pursuant to an inform-
ant's "tip" subsequently corroborated by the police officer, despite the holding in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) that a "stop and frisk" is permissible only where the officer
himself "observes unusual conduct." Id. at 30.
91. For example, the search in Smyth was conducted at 12:45 a.m. by a group of
five officials, two of whom were deputized campus security officers. 398 F. Supp. at
782.
92. Consider, for example, the regulations involved in Moore (Troy State Universi-
ty) and Smyth (Grand Valley State College). The Troy State student handbook provided
that university-conducted residence hall searches must be authorized by the "administra-
tion." See note 42 supra. The Grand Valley regulation provided the student somewhat
greater protection, requiring that the college "President or a designee" authorize dormito-
ry searches. See note 20 supra.
The Smyth court suggested that colleges "explore the possibility of a warrant
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search be conducted in a reasonable manner, within a proper scope,93
and at a reasonable time. 4
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the prophylactic effect of the fourth
amendment is sufficient to protect college residence hall occupants from
warrantless room searches conducted by the police to procure evidence
for use in criminal proceedings. Moreover, if college officials expect to
find evidence of a criminal offense in a dormitory search and intend to
have criminal charges brought against the student, then there should be
full compliance with the mandates of the fourth amendment, including
the warrant requirement.95 Whether the amendment also forbids uni-
procedure internal to the institution." 398 F. Supp. at 792. Such a plan would provide
minimal procedural safeguards and would apparently be viewed favorably by educators.
The Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, which has been approved by
the Association of American Colleges, the American Association of University Profes-
sors, the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, the National Associ-
ation of Women Deans and Counsellors, and the American Association of Higher
Education, provides that "an appropriate and responsible authority should be designated
to whom application should be made before a [residence hall] search is conducted." See
Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend, supra note 81, at 296, 305.
93. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 62-65 (1968).
The scope of regular inspections to check for compliance with health and safety
regulations is generally limited to examination of conditions visible to any visitor to the
room. If the intrusion is in fact so limited, college officials would probably be
authorized to inspect rooms without a showing of reasonable cause. Health and safety
inspections have generally been treated with leniency by the courts. A distinction has
been made between the term "inspection," which is not aimed at uncovering evidence for
purposes of subsequent imposition of penalties, and the term "search," which implies an
expectation of uncovering evidence of wrongdoing. See United States v. Alfred M.
Lewis, Inc., 431 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); United States v.
Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); F. GRAD,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 76 (1965).
94. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971); Parrish v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967); Reich, Midnight Wel-
fare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE LJ. 1347 (1963). A search such as
the one conducted in Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975) would
probably be deemed unreasonable since it occurred at 12:45 a.m. and without notice. Id.
at 782. Additionally, the student should be present during the search if possible. See
Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend, supra note 81, at 305.
95. There has been concern among judges and commentators that if college officials
are permitted to search without a warrant the evidence they find may well be used in
subsequent criminal proceedings. See Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 787 (W.D.
Mich. 1975); K. ALEXANDER & E. SOLOMAN, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW 429-30
(1972). See also Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
There is, of course, the possibility that a reasonable entry by campus administrators
into a student's room, not directed at obtaining evidence of a crime, might result in the
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versity-conducted dormitory searches for intra-university disciplinary
purposes, however, is less certain. Neither the waiver theory nor that
of a university's inherent right to promulgate reasonable regulations
is sufficient, standing alone, to support an abrogation of a student's
fourth amendment rights in his dormitory room. Nor can a warrantless
invasion of a student's residence be exempted from the category of
searches contemplated by the fourth amendment. The alternative ra-
tionale advanced in support of the holding in Wyman v. James,"
however, opens the door to a fiiding of reasonableness where a warrant-
less non-criminal search is limited in its impact and is necessary to the
achievement of an important government purpose. University-conduct-
ed dormitory searches for internal disciplinary purposes may be support-
able under this rubric if no practical alternative is available and if the
search procedures are so closely circumscribed as to preclude arbitrary
official conduct.
discovery of such evidence. Under these circumstances, the evidence may either be
admissible in a criminal proceeding under the so-called "plain view" doctrine, or used by
police to establish probable cause in order to obtain a warrant for a subsequent search.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-73 (1971); Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309, 323 (1971).
96. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
['Vol. 1976:770
